Subject: NFLA submission to the Nuclear Education Trust Inquiry into UK defence needs and nuclear disarmament commitments; and the wider context of UK nuclear weapons policy

1. **Introduction**

The NFLA was one of a number of organisations that have been again approached by the Nuclear Education Trust (NET) to participate in its inquiry into ‘the UK’s national defence needs and international nuclear disarmament responsibilities’. The response has been developed by the NFLA Secretary and approved under delegated authority by the NFLA Chair. The NFLA Secretary has also discussed the response with officers in the Mayors for Peace organisation, which the NFLA cooperate with in seeking to achieve their common aim of a nuclear weapons free world. This briefing provides that response within a wider context of recent developments of the UK Government’s nuclear weapon policy.

2. **The Nuclear Education Trust (NET) & previous inquiry on Trident Alternatives Review**

According to its website: “The Nuclear Education Trust exists to advance education by promoting the study and understanding of, and research into, arms control and disarmament, defence and security, with an emphasis on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.” (1)

In 2012, the NFLA was one of a number of contributing organisations to a NET inquiry into the Trident Alternatives Review and the future position of the Barrow dockyard, where Trident nuclear submarines are constructed. (2) Amongst other contributing respondents were former Foreign and Defence Ministers, local MPs, trade unions, disarmament NGOs and academics involved in the disarmament issue. The final report was considered in a special event held in Portcullis House, Westminster in December 2012, at which there were specific verbal presentations given by the former UK Defence Ministers Sir Nick Harvey and Lord West, the Chair of the Parliamentary Defence Select Committee James Arbuthnot MP, the Vice Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Daniel Blaney, the Head of Organisation from the Trades Union Congress Paul Nowak, and the local MP for Barrow, John Woodcock.

The seminar considered the likely content of the Cabinet Office’s review of the alternatives for a like-for-like replacement of the Trident nuclear weapons programme. Other representatives who spoke in the seminar included local trade unions, interested academics involved in the area of defence diversification and disarmament groups like CND and the NFLA. The former Defence Minister Nick Harvey, who had been leading the Cabinet Office review until shortly before the seminar, commented at the seminar that he believed it was possible to end the ‘Continuous At Sea Deterrence’ (CASD) defence strategy for Trident submarines. He also argued that it was also possible to have a more limited Trident replacement programme. (3) Other representatives opposed this policy or wished to see it taken considerably further.
The NFLA’s submission to this NET study was fully outlined in NFLA Policy Briefing 102. (4) The NFLA response also advocated the end of CASD and argued that the Trident replacement programme should be discontinued in favour of a dedicated policy to develop multilateral nuclear disarmament. It also advocated a policy of defence diversification to assist with gradual reductions to the Barrow dockyard workforce.

3. **Cabinet Office Trident Alternatives Review**

As part of the 2010 UK Coalition Government Agreement on defence policy, the Cabinet Office was tasked with developing a review of the future decision the UK Government would make after the 2015 general election on the renewal and replacement of the Trident nuclear weapons programme. The review considered a variety of nuclear weapon systems and postures as an alternative to ‘like-for-like’ replacement, and investigated their feasibility and how they might be delivered, although it made no specific recommendations for or against any particular system.

The Trident Alternatives Review was finally published by the UK Government’s Cabinet Office in September 2013. Its overall conclusion was that there are credible alternatives to replacing the UK’s current Trident nuclear weapons system. However, it has calculated that these alternatives would cost more and might not guarantee the same “degree of resilience” as the government's preferred 'like-for-like' replacement option.

Large aircraft, fast jets, surface ships, and three types of submarine - different designs of ‘hunter-killer’ submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and a submarine design that could fire either ballistic missiles or cruise missiles – were considered as potential future platforms for the UK's nuclear weapons. As well as different launch platforms, the review also considered a range of different postures for the deployment of nuclear weapons. Five different options were presented in the report, ranging from the current “continuous at sea deterrence” posture to lower degrees of nuclear readiness.

As Peter Burt of the Nuclear Information Service (NIS) has commented, although much of the analysis carried out by civil servants remains unpublished, the Trident Alternatives Review nevertheless represents the most detailed assessment of nuclear policy options ever published by the UK government. It also provides a far greater depth of insight into government thinking than was published in the 2006 White Paper on Trident replacement. (5)

The review defined the requirement for the UK's nuclear weapons as “a minimum nuclear deterrent capability that, during a crisis, is able to deliver at short notice a nuclear strike against a range of targets at an appropriate scale and with very high confidence,” and then assessed how effectively a range of various alternative systems might meet this requirement. It also considered the contribution that the UK's nuclear weapons capability makes to NATO's nuclear doctrine.

The review describes design and development of a new warhead as the “critical challenge” to developing an alternative platform to Trident, such as a nuclear cruise missile or air-launched bomb, as the UK's current warhead programme is heavily focused on Trident. Different warhead designs would be needed for ballistic missiles, for cruise missiles and for free-fall bombs, making a considerable difference to the costs, timing and technical risks for each of the different systems. The UK derives considerable cost benefits by using a warhead which is based on an American design and compatible with an American missile system.

The review estimates that it would take 17 years to develop a new ballistic missile-based warhead to replace the current Trident warhead, and even longer for an alternative system – possibly up to 24 years for a cruise-missile based system. Development of a new Trident warhead would be expected to cost around £4 billion, whereas development of a new warhead for a cruise missile or free-fall bomb would cost around £8-10 billion. In the absence of an equivalent US warhead programme, the UK would have to invest significantly in developing non-nuclear warhead components.

Unlike non-Trident options, the cost driver for Trident missile options is the construction of new submarines. In terms of whole-life costs, a three-submarine Trident fleet was considered to be the cheapest option investigated in the review, with hunter-killer submarine and air-launched options assessed as considerably more expensive.
In the view of NIS, the Review glosses over broader issues relating to the international impact that a move to a new posture or platform might have, stating that “the precise short-term impact of how any change is received would depend on the type of new system/posture and, crucially, on whether it represented a diminution in the UK’s associated level of deterrent ambition”. Legal issues are also side-stepped with a statement that the UK takes the position that pursuit of a renewal of Trident or a new system does not breach the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (6)

The review concludes that “there are alternatives to Trident that would enable the UK to be capable of inflicting significant damage such that most potential adversaries around the world would be deterred”, and that the UK could adopt alternative non-continuous deployment postures for its nuclear weapons, although these would not offer the “same degree of resilience” as the current posture of continuous deployment of nuclear weapons. (7) A decision on whether to operate submarines in a non-continuous posture would depend upon the level of political confidence that there would be no sudden unexpected attack on the UK and that back-to-back nuclear patrols could recommence during a crisis.

The NFLA is disappointed that the terms of reference of the Cabinet Office Review did not cover a non-nuclear option. However, CND has recently published ‘The Real Alternative’ - a review outlining the case for completely abolishing the UK’s nuclear weapon capability. (8)

In its report, CND argued:

- The question of whether or not to replace the Trident nuclear weapon system is of great security and economic importance. Therefore, ahead of the parliamentary vote in 2016, the full range of options must be explored.
- The decision must be taken on the basis of what will most contribute to the security of the British people, with a clear understanding of the security challenges of the 21st century.
- Non-replacement is a credible option, which offers serious strategic and economic benefits, including:
  - improved national security – through budgetary flexibility in the Ministry of Defence and a more effective response to emerging security challenges in the 21st century;
  - improved global security – through a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, deterring of nuclear proliferation and de-escalation of international tensions;
  - vast economic savings – of more than £100 billion over the lifetime of a successor nuclear weapons system, releasing resources for effective security spending, as well as a range of public spending priorities;
  - adherence to legal obligations including responsibilities as a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
  - moral and diplomatic leadership in global multilateral disarmament initiatives such as a global nuclear abolition treaty and the UN’s proposed Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East.

NFLA would add that, with a major diplomatic offensive, the UK Government could gain significant international traction for nuclear weapons disarmament if it actually renounced nuclear weapons. A nuclear free UK would make it much harder for France to retain nuclear weapons and easier for countries like Germany and the Netherlands to call for US weapons to be removed from their territory.

4. Political response to the Review

It should be noted that the Review was conducted as part of the UK Government Coalition Agreement to specifically allow the Liberal Democrats to make the case for alternatives to ‘like-for-like’ Trident replacement. The Review has not altered Conservative Party policy, which remains to construct a full ‘like for like’ Trident replacement programme.
Labour’s response to the Review came from the former Shadow Defence Secretary Jim Murphy: “Labour has always said we are committed to the minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent, which we believe is best delivered through a continuous at-sea deterrent. It would require a substantial body of evidence for us to change that, but this review does not appear to offer such evidence.”

However, Labour has kept options open that it may reduce the amount of nuclear warheads carried by new Trident submarines. Mr Murphy said: “Labour would keep momentum on our disarmament efforts, looking at further reduction of missiles and warheads on deployed vessels, as well as taking a lead internationally to push the agenda of global anti-proliferation.” (9)

Two major electoral tests in 2014 and 2015 are likely to see the UK’s nuclear weapons policy debated to some extent – the Scottish independence referendum of 18th September 2014 and the UK General Election formally set for 7th May 2015.

The NFLA Annual Policy Seminar in Cardiff County Hall on the 6th December 2013 is partially considering the potential policy developments from these debates. Rebecca Johnson, Vice Chair of ICAN-UK and Director of the Acronym Institute will be speaking on this particular subject. Paul Flynn MP will also be providing an overview of Parliamentary currents with the UK nuclear policy debate and David Lowry will refer to wider concerns over nuclear security and nuclear proliferation. (10) This seminar will give the NFLA the opportunity to consider how these pivotal events may affect nuclear weapons policy.

5. **NFLA response to new NET inquiry**

Following on from their previous inquiry into the Trident Alternatives Review and the publication of the Cabinet Office’s Trident Alternatives Review, NET have asked all contributing organisations a new series of questions considering broader questions of UK defence needs and its nuclear disarmament responsibilities. The NFLA response to those questions now follows. Respondents were asked by NET not to exceed a total of 2500 words for a submission, so the NFLA’s respond is necessarily brief and generic in scope. Some of the other respondents have spoken in face-to-face or telephone interviews.

The aim of this follow-up inquiry for NET is to consider UK nuclear weapons policy in a broader context in terms of its interaction with wider defence policy and in the UK’s role within the international nuclear non-proliferation structures. NFLA is pleased to have been included in this inquiry.

**NUCLEAR EDUCATION TRUST (NET) INQUIRY INTO THE UK’S NATIONAL DEFENCE NEEDS & INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT RESPONSIBILITIES**

*National defence needs*

*a. Do you agree with the Tier One and Tier Two classification of threats in the Coalition’s National Security Strategy?*

The NFLA generally agrees with the Tier One and Tier Two assessment of threats in the Coalition’s National Security Strategy. It has some concerns though that a (Tier Two) direct nuclear attack by a foreign state or proxy on the UK would have a much greater impact than a (Tier One) terrorist attack using a crude device (“a dirty bomb”), even though the likelihood of such an attack would be much lower.

In reference to the amount of public funds spent on the UK’s nuclear weapons programme, in comparison to its work on combating terrorism, it would be interesting to compare these figures to see how the Government calculates the risk of either occurring.

*b. How far should UK policies of defence or intervention be dependent on those of the USA and NATO?*
At present, the UK policies of defence or intervention are closely allied with those of the USA and NATO, and the UK has usually gone into a conflict situation when requested to do so by either parties. However, the recent decision by Parliament not to seek military intervention in Syria until the international support of a second United Nations resolution, despite significant military and American pressure to do so, sets an encouraging precedent for the future. The NFLA would argue that the UK policies should first and foremost be determined by public and Parliamentary consent, particularly in relation to a conflict that could ultimately use nuclear weapons.

c. What role, if any, would UK nuclear weapons have with regards to current and future threats as well as long term responsibilities?

The NFLA was established in 1980 to call for a nuclear weapons free world. In its close association with the international Mayors for Peace organisation, led by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that still remains its ultimate policy. The UK should seek to be pro-active to reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile and work in a much more determined fashion with other states for multilateral nuclear disarmament.

This should include cancelling the Trident replacement programme. The most effective way to deal with current and future threats is to improve the structure and effectiveness of the United Nations to seek more peaceful ways to deal with national and international conflicts.

International nuclear disarmament responsibilities
d. Do you agree with overall defence policy which moves towards a nuclear free world as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty? (Do you think this will happen by 2050, 3000, ever?)

The NFLA works in conjunction with the Mayors for Peace to seek a nuclear weapons free world and believes UK defence policy should have this as its clear and complete aim – as it is enshrined under the commitments of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Though the NPT is a far from perfect tool for multilateral nuclear disarmament, it has largely prevented a major escalation of states developing nuclear weapons programmes (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea being the only states to transgress) and has helped with a number of states to disarm their nuclear programmes (e.g. South Africa, Libya, Brazil, former states of the Soviet Union outside Russia, such as Ukraine and Belarus).

The NFLA has consistently worked with Mayors for Peace to seek to develop concrete international moves to nuclear weapons disarmament by 2020 – the Mayors for Peace’s ‘2020 Vision’. The imperative has to be to reduce and eventually abolish nuclear weapons as quickly as is possible and practical. It is the will of the vast majority of states in the world to see the Treaty fulfilled in its totality. It is always difficult to put a final date on a nuclear weapons free world, but the intransigence of the ‘P5’ states (the permanent members of the UN Security Council) and continuing concerns over instability in the Middle East give added impetus to speeding up this process. Reform of the United Nations structures could also assist making the NPT regime more effective.

In this area, the NFLA fully supports the Mayors for Peace’s ‘Good Faith Challenge’ relating to Article 6 of the NPT. The UK Government are presently showing a lack of ‘good faith’ in its lack of co-operation with the NPT regime, in the same manner as the other ‘P5’ states. The UK Government refused to attend the 2013 UN Oslo Conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It is also not actively participating in the meetings of the Open Ended Working Group on Nuclear Weapons Disarmament in the United Nations offices in Geneva. This raises questions about UK Government claims that it is being a leader within the ‘P5’ on disarmament initiatives.

Furthermore, in the recent historic United Nations General Assembly meeting on Nuclear Disarmament neither Prime Minister David Cameron nor the Foreign Minister William Hague were in attendance. The majority of other UN members had a President or Prime Minister in attendance at the meeting, such as the Irish Government, where Tánaiste and Foreign Minister
Eamon Gilmore was present and took a very active role in the meeting, calling for more ambitious steps for a nuclear weapons free world.

Such behaviour emphasises that the UK government is not showing sufficient ‘good faith’ in its nuclear disarmament responsibilities. It should rather be seeking to encourage all the ‘P5’ states to engage in these worthwhile and important discussions which are attempting to lift the logjam within the NPT arrangements – this would comply with the Mayors for Peace ‘Good Faith Challenge’ and radically alter the sense of stalemate at the NPT.

NFLA certainly does not want to wait till 2030 or 2050 (or beyond) for full nuclear disarmament and continually calls for a swifter timetable through the NPT regime.

e. Do you agree that Britain needs to take an active part in the multilateral process of nuclear disarmament?

The NFLA believes this is an absolute imperative of UK Government foreign policy. The current Coalition Government’s record on promoting multilateral nuclear disarmament in the past 3 years has been reasonable but not eye-catching. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review did include some significant “unilateral” measures on disarmament matters. However, there is an appearance that the UK seems to be working closely within the ‘P5’ to frustrate the wishes of non-nuclear weapon states to move the disarmament agenda at a much quicker pace. It is also disappointing that it has not taken an active part in the initiatives considering the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon attack.

f. How should the UK plan to meet its strategic security needs and its international responsibilities?

It should refocus its national security needs to deal with the much more complicated matters of dealing with non-state terrorism, cyber attacks, natural disasters and the ongoing problems likely to be created by long-term climate change.

By taking a more prominent role in nuclear disarmament discussions it could refocus its military to deal with conventional defence matters, the protection of the civilian population and international peacekeeping operations. It should also take a leading role in the reform of the United Nations to bring greater equity in international relations.

The likely future threats to national security could well come from environmental degradation, technological complexities and health pandemics if medical science can not keep up with germ mutations. This requires a wholesale review of defence policy and a more flexible national security policy. However, as long as nuclear weapons are retained and the causes of terrorism and the deep divisions remain in the world, the capacity of the military will also have to maintain a critical mass able to deal with lower level conflict. A nuclear weapons free world will significantly take the pressure off the military to deal with the other great complexities affecting our world.

Next steps towards disarmament

g. In meeting disarmament responsibilities would this be a single step from the current system to non-nuclear status or would there be interim steps?

The NFLA and the Mayors for Peace are clear that multilateral nuclear disarmament is not a straightforward matter, relying on a level of verification and complete trust on all sides. The NPT regime outlines a sensible process for disarmament. The NFLA endorse the Mayors for Peace’s ‘Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol’ (see Appendix 1) as an excellent example of a staged process for meeting disarmament responsibilities.

h. What conditions could need to pertain for Britain to have the confidence to take any of these steps and how could HMG operate to help bring about these conditions?
The further development of nuclear weapon free zones is a useful starting point for multilateral disarmament. The promotion of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East would be immensely useful for reducing tensions in this extremely troubled part of the world. An East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, bringing North Korea fully into a state of nuclear disarmament, would also create a greater sense of confidence.

The moves for effective verification of nuclear weapon disarmament, that the UK has been working with the Norwegian Government on, is one of the most positive areas of UK Government policy in this area. Such an initiative is useful in creating an important level of confidence and trust for all states will need to have in reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles.

The UK has a relatively small amount of nuclear weapons in comparison with the United States and Russia. It should continue to encourage these two states to take the greatest steps to reduce their large stockpiles, and reduce its own stockpiles commensurately.

There also needs to be a more robust regime at the international level to ensure all levels of weapons grade plutonium is recorded and verified. The continuing number of incidents of illegal sales by groups of such materials is evidence that the international authorities do not have a complete handle on this issue, and it has to remain a major concern that a terrorist group could get control of such material. More concerted efforts to understand and deal with the causes of terrorism are also vital in developing the conditions that assist with nuclear weapons disarmament.

**i. What might interim steps look like? Specify the positives and negatives of different steps? (Are humanitarian disarmament, unacceptable harm and Nuclear Free Zones useful terms)**

Some interim steps that the UK could take include the following:

a. Encourage the ‘P5’ to engage in the international discussions over the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in order to make all states aware of the urgent need for disarmament.

b. As noted above, seek to encourage the creation of a Middle East WMD Free Zone and an East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. This would be followed by diplomatic moves to de-escalate tensions in Kashmir to allow for concrete discussions on disarming nuclear weapons in the Indian sub-continent. The NFLA sees no negatives in the development of such a policy, as long as they are verifiable.

c. Reform the United Nations to make it more democratic in nature and responsive to its state members. This will not be an easy task after decades of power politics and improving trust within international diplomacy but the medium to long term benefits would be hugely positive. Like with the NPT regime, it requires a measure of constructive bargaining to create a greater sense of fairness.

d. ‘Humanitarian disarmament’ and ‘unacceptable harm’ are concepts which need greater definition but could be useful in improving trust and a more ethical foreign and defence policy. However, in the short term they will be difficult to define within the current defence paradigm.

**j. What role would you envisage the UN or other international agencies such as IAEA having in steps towards disarmament?**

With sensible and practical reform, the UN could play the lead role in effective steps towards disarmament. The current illogical and unfair structure of the UN makes it extremely difficult to move disarmament policies beyond the interminably slow pace that they are currently at.

In the NFLA’s view, the IAEA also needs to be reformed due to its role, within the NPT, to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power. The NFLA wants to see the medium term phasing out of nuclear power to ensure a safer, risk free and sustainable energy policy dominated by a wide renewable energy mix. The close partnership of the defence and civil nuclear industry has been pernicious in the ongoing weakness of the NPT regime.
Wider political and economic factors

**k. How far should the cost of replacement and maintenance of nuclear weapons be factors in any decision?**

In a time of huge financial austerity across much of the world, the cost of replacement and maintenance of nuclear weapons is inevitably going to be a factor in decisions to disarm. The huge benefits that would be attained by diverting resources from nuclear weapons to conventional defence and other social and economic parts of the national budget goes without saying. The NFLA would always argue that there is a strong ethical and moral imperative in nuclear weapons disarmament and the extreme effects of these weapons should always necessitate against their use. This is why they remain ridiculous and irrational parts of UK defence policy. However, with the size of the UK’s overall debt burden the cancelling of Trident replacement is not just a political, ethical and moral imperative, it is also economic good sense.

**l. How far should jobs and employment be a factor in any decision on nuclear weapons?**

The NFLA believe clearly and unequivocally that decisions on nuclear weapons should be based on foreign policy and security needs, not employment policies. It should be noted that, pound for pound, spending on nuclear weapons is one of the least cost effective ways of generating jobs.

The jobs and employment that maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons programme are made up of highly skilled scientific and technical staff, which remains an asset to the UK economy. Significant employment opportunities will remain in any moves for nuclear weapons disarmament for many years to come and a core staff monitoring this process will need to be retained. For many years, the NFLA has also advocated sensible defence diversification to encourage such scientific and technical expertise to be harnessed for other useful parts of the economy. The NFLA outlined some examples of this in its previous submission to the NET on Trident replacement and the Barrow dockyard.

In the area of nuclear power for example, the NFLA believes there are many sustainable jobs in dealing with decommissioning and ongoing safe management of radioactive waste for decades and more to come. This includes the safe management of the UK’s weapons usable plutonium stock. There are further opportunities with transferring such staff into the development of innovative and technical renewable alternatives to nuclear power which can be achieved with an innovative and imaginative industrial policy. The same can be said with jobs in the nuclear weapons programme, which has a similar jobs structure.

**m. How far should public opinion be a factor in any decision on nuclear weapons?**

NFLA notes that public information and full debate on the UK nuclear weapons programme has been limited, and often coloured by government views and the views of political parties rather than of an informed and objective discussion.

All fundamental political decisions should have a strong element of public consent. For many years the majority of the public has called for nuclear weapons disarmament and a conventional defence policy. It is surely time in this area for the UK Government to comply with the wishes of the public.

6. **Next steps with NET inquiry**

NET is concluding their interviews at present and will seek to develop a summary report of comments by the end of the year. A special Parliamentary event bringing together key respondents to the inquiry and senior Parliamentarians is planned for 29th January 2014 in Portcullis House, Westminster. The NFLA Secretariat will be represented at this meeting.

7. **Next steps for NFLA with nuclear weapons issue**

Staff from NFLA are co-operating with the Mayors for Peace in the development of a UK & Ireland Mayors for Peace Chapter, as was outlined in NFLA Policy Briefing 114 (11). This will assist both organisations in bringing a greater level of interest in these and wider issues with
Councils across the British and Irish Isles. It will also allow for the possibility of developing a coalition of support with like-minded non-governmental groups (NGOs).

The NFLA Annual Policy Seminar in December 2013 will give the opportunity to take stock of the nuclear weapons issue and consider how NFLA develops its policy and wider cooperation in the next two years.

The BASIC Trident Commission is also expected to report in early 2014. Led by former UK Defence and Foreign Secretaries / party spokespersons, this report could play an influential role in the UK nuclear weapons debate.

In 2014 two important events will also be held – the final Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Preparatory Conference at the UN of the 2010 – 14 session (before the five yearly 2015 Review Conference) in May and a special Mayors for Peace board meeting in June in Sarajevo, close to the centenary commemorations for the start of the First World War. NFLA staff is hoping to attend both events.

8. Conclusions and recommendations
The NET inquiries and the Cabinet Office’s Trident Alternatives Review are clear reminders of a slow changing but important new current in the discussions over the UK's nuclear weapon policy. The next two years will see significant challenges to the UK policy and a potential for nuanced change. Whilst there remain several hurdles to the type of radical change in nuclear weapons reductions that the NFLA wish to see, there also remain a lot of positive currents at the UN and in both the UK and Republic of Ireland.

The NFLA’s cooperation with Mayors for Peace and with NGOs like ICAN-UK, CND, NIS, NET, the Trident Commission, BASIC and Abolition 2000 throughout recent years has allowed it to remain informed in changing currents with the nuclear weapons issue, put forward on regular occasions its own policy stance and maintained its continuing commitment to see further reductions in nuclear weapons in the UK and across the world. There are further opportunities to develop cooperation and influence Parliamentarians and diplomats over the next two years as key nuclear weapons policies are fully reviewed.

In the short term, NFLA members are encouraged to attend its Annual Policy Seminar in Cardiff on the 6th December. NFLA members are also encouraged to consider hosting the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bomb exhibition and remain involved in a positive fashion with this wider issue.

9. References
(1) For further information on the Nuclear Education Trust, consult http://www.nucleareducationtrust.org
(6) Comments made by the senior Foreign Office official at the NPT Preparatory Conference seminar on UK and French nuclear weapons cooperation, Geneva, May 2013.
(8) CND report, The Real Alternative to Trident Replacement http://www.cnduk.org/component/k2/item/1697
(10) NFLA Annual Policy Seminar, Cardiff County Hall, 6th December 2013 http://www.nuclearpolicy.info/docs/events/NFLA_2013_AGM_Cardiff_Seminar_Photoflyer.pdf
(11) NFLA Policy Briefing 114, Mayors for Peace Executive and General Conference, August 2013 http://www.nuclearpolicy.info/docs/briefings/A228_(NB114)_Mayors_for_Peace_Conference.pdf
Appendix 1

THE HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI PROTOCOL
A protocol complementary to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world by the year 2020

Desiring to establish an over-arching means of addressing nuclear disarmament in all its aspects so as to facilitate the fulfillment by States Parties of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and with a view to all states fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligation found by the International Court of Justice in their 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

Considering that continued exploitation of the discriminatory nature of the Treaty, wherein nuclear weapon States Parties are exempted from the prohibition on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, is incompatible with the pursuit in good faith of nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

Considering further that full equality under international law must be re-established by the elimination of all nuclear arsenals as agreed in the 1995 Extension Conference decision on “Principles and Objectives”.

**Article I**

1. The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Protocol shall cease forthwith:

   (a) all activities related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons which non-nuclear-weapon States Parties are prohibited from pursuing under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

   (b) all activities which incorporate nuclear weapons into their military doctrines and practices; and shall place all nuclear weapons and weapon-usable fissile materials in safe and secure storage at the earliest possible date.

2. All other States Parties to this Protocol possessing weapons-usable fissile material shall take those steps required of the nuclear-weapon States in paragraph 1 which apply to their circumstances.

**Article II**

1. The States Parties to this Protocol shall pursue in good faith negotiations on achieving nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under the following two main sections: Section One negotiations will standardize and legally codify the measures taken under Article I, paragraph 1, (a) and (b). Section Two negotiations will address:

   (c) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and related deployment systems, including delivery vehicles, launch platforms, and command and control systems.

   (d) the elimination of all infrastructure associated with the acquisition of nuclear-weapon systems, including production and testing facilities, and of all weapon-usable fissile material stocks.

1. The negotiations called for in paragraph 1 shall have as their objective a Nuclear Weapons Convention or a comparable Framework Agreement. Negotiations shall begin forthwith and be pursued without interruption by all States Parties until this objective is achieved. A Secretariat for the negotiations shall be established that remains in operation until negotiations are concluded.
2. Every good faith effort shall be made to ensure that all measures related to Section One are agreed and implemented before or by 2015 and that all measures related to Section Two are agreed and implemented before or by 2020.

3. All measures contained or foreseen in the Nuclear Weapons Convention or Framework Agreement shall be subject to strict and effective international control and shall provide for international institutions capable of ensuring that the nuclear-weapon free world which is achieved can be maintained indefinitely.

**Article III**

Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as diminishing in anyway the nonproliferation obligations of any State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; including each State’s obligation to cooperate in the establishment and operation of the international institutions of Article II, paragraph 4.