

Nuclear Free Local Authorities

briefing



Date: 15th June 2010

No.74

Subject: **Safety and emergency planning of nuclear weapons transportation convoys**

1. Purpose of this briefing

This NFLA briefing has been developed by the NFLA Secretary, Sean Morris. The NFLA gratefully acknowledges additional information provided by the pressure group Nukewatch; John Ainslie, the Co-ordinator of CND Scotland; and Peter Burt, Secretary of the independent nuclear policy group, Nuclear Information Service.

The briefing originates from a questionnaire found in the Scottish Government's report – 'Scotland Without Nuclear Weapons' (1) of Scottish Council Emergency Planning Units on the knowledge of, and planning for, nuclear weapons convoys that pass over Scottish roads to the naval bases at Faslane and Coulport that host the Trident nuclear submarine programme. An overview of this report was provided at a NFLA Scotland seminar in Inverkeithing in February 2010 and to the NFLA Steering Committee.

In the absence of an English legislative body to follow this up, the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Secretariat undertook an identical questionnaire of English and Welsh Councils (though no road convoys have been known to travel through Wales since the closure of the AWE establishment in Cardiff in 1997, flights carrying nuclear weapons can overfly parts of Wales and thus Welsh Councils receive guidance from the MoD on emergency planning for a nuclear weapons accident). The findings of this questionnaire were presented to a NFLA English Forum seminar in Oxford in March 2010 and to the NFLA Steering Committee.

This briefing therefore outlines:

- An overview of nuclear weapons convoys in Britain
- The MoD's Local Authorities Emergency Services Information (LAESI) guidance on the emergency arrangements around nuclear weapons convoys
- An overview of nuclear emergency planning arrangements in the UK and Ireland
- Suggested actions for local authorities and the continuing work of the NFLA in this area, including the development of a seminar on nuclear emergency planning.

2. Nuclear weapons convoys in Britain

The UK's nuclear warheads, known as Trident, are manufactured at the Atomic Weapons Establishments (AWE) in Aldermaston and Burghfield, West Berkshire. Trident submarines, which transport the missiles, are stationed at HMNB Clyde at Faslane, some 25 miles north west of Glasgow. RNAD Coulport, 8 miles from Faslane, is responsible for


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for the storage, processing, maintenance and issue of the Trident nuclear warheads and the ammunitioning tasks for all submarine embarked weapons. (2)

Elaborate and long convoys have been devised by the Ministry of Defence to bring nuclear weapons and materials from Berkshire to Argyll and Bute. The following map, courtesy of the pressure group, Nukewatch (3), and on their website, outlines the known major trunk roads that convoys have used:



3. The make-up of a nuclear weapons convoy

Given the obvious need for tight security, a nuclear weapons convoy is made up of a considerable number of Ministry of Defence vehicles, support vehicles and a full Police escort. Around 100 personnel travel with the convoy, which is in constant communication with a Task Control cell at the Ministry of Defence Police Central Control Room (4).

A warhead convoy contains:

- the warhead load carriers (large plain dark green trucks);
- Ministry of Defence Police escort vehicles;
- military support vehicles to deal with accidents or breakdowns;
- Royal Marines (in white minibuses - although different colours have been used at different times in the convoy's history);
- an MoD fire engine.

The warhead carriers are 44 tons, seven axle, articulated dark green trucks. These trucks are known as TCHD's, short for Truck Cargo Heavy Duty. TCHD trucks are currently undergoing a replacement / refurbishment programme and new vehicles are expected to

enter into service later this year. Apart from the Marines' vehicles, the convoy is garaged and maintained at Aldermaston in West Berkshire.

4. **MOD LAESI guidelines**

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has produced official guidance (5) for the benefit of the civilian emergency services and local authorities to outline the nature of nuclear weapon convoys and the emergency arrangements that would be put in place in the event of a major incident and / or radiation release. The guidance is referred to as the LAESI (Local Authority Emergency Service Information) guidelines and are sent to Emergency Planning Officers for the three emergency services (Police, Fire and Ambulance / Health) and the local authorities where convoys travel through from Aldermaston or Burghfield to Scotland.

LAESI Edition 7 provides information on the following:

- the emergency management arrangements in the event of a major incident, which would be led by the MoD and the military;
- an explanation of the type of materials transported in a convoy;
- MoD assistance at the local level in the event of an incident.

The guidance provides an explanation of the emergency arrangements for nuclear weapon convoys. They also provide a summary on the risks from an incident and the short, medium and long-term actions to a radiation release. They do **not** include information on convoy routes.

The guidance also notes that MoD personnel are available for involvement in local authority or emergency service 'live' or 'tabletop' planning exercises. MoD personnel are also available to provide briefings to Local or Regional Resilience Forums (LRFs / RRFs) on request. It is in this area that the Scottish Parliament and NFLA questionnaires have found some potential gaps, as outlined below in section 7.

It is worth noting that advice in the LAESI guidelines has changed over time. For example, early versions contained the advice: 'If weapon is jetting (flames under pressure) explosion may be imminent, debris may be scattered within 600m radius.' Firefighters were advised to lash spray branches to cool the fire and retreat. Later versions no longer contain this information.

One key part of the questionnaires that needs to be focused on for this NFLA briefing is that, for security reasons, the MOD only informs the Chief Constable of the Police forces through which a convoy is travelling through. It is at the discretion of the Police force if compatriot Fire or Ambulance Services are informed or relevant Local Authority Principal Emergency Planning Officers.

The NFLA believes it is reasonable that Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers and Fire & Rescue Services should be provided with information about the routes warhead convoys take, and be notified when a convoy is to pass through their area in the same way that the Police are, particularly as most Principal Emergency Planning Officers receive security clearance for receiving other sensitive information (as noted below).

5. **Can accidents happen?**

Before focusing on the Scottish and English questionnaires on weapons convoys, it is useful to determine if there is any real risk of accidents or a radiation release.

According to information placed by the Secretary of State for Defence in the Library of both Houses of Parliament in October 2003 (6), there have been **seven** accidents involving British nuclear weapons since 1966, none of which have involved the release of radioactive material. An unclassified summary of a report by Sir Ronald Oxburgh (then Chief Scientific

Adviser to the Ministry of Defence) into all aspects of nuclear safety published in 1992 also referred to "some twenty" accidents and incidents since 1960.

Part 1 of the table below provides summary descriptions of the seven accidents and, where the information is still available, of any subsequent investigation and follow-up action. Part 2 of the table provides similar descriptions of other events (or "incidents") included in the Oxburgh report, defined as an unplanned occurrence which did not constitute an accident but were reported in the interests of safety, or because they were likely to attract public or media attention.

Part 1 – Accidents

An accident is defined in the Oxburgh report as "an unplanned occurrence involving the destruction of, or damage, or suspected damage to, a nuclear weapon which has resulted in actual or potential hazard to life or property, or which may have impaired nuclear safety". There are two categories:

Category 1: in which there are reasonable grounds for concluding that no release of radioactive material has occurred.

Category 2: in which a release of radioactive material has been detected, or the nature or severity of the occurrence is such that the possibility of a release cannot be excluded. There has never been a Category 2 accident involving a British nuclear weapon.

Date	Location	Cause and description	Results of any enquiry and subsequent action
1 April 1973		Near the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulport. A Scottish Electricity Board Land Rover reversed into a RAF nuclear weapon load carrier transporting nuclear warheads for Polaris missiles. Minor damage was caused to the load carrier. The weapons were not damaged.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
2 February 1974	Off Malta.	Two Mk44 torpedoes which were being removed from a storage rack fell a few inches onto a WE177 weapon. There was some superficial scratching on the plastic protective strips on the edges of the weapon's rear tail fin. There was no damage to the weapon itself.	Investigation of the incident concluded that the torpedo handling equipment was incorrectly rigged and modifications were made to the equipment as a result.
3 1974	At sea	The diaphragm of a missile tube compressed on to a Polaris missile. There was no damage to missile or warheads.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action. But see below on the similar occurrence at serial 5.
4 August 1977	RNAD Coulport	While a Polaris missile was being lifted during re-alignment, the threads on a securing pin stripped due to the incorrect assembly of a hoist fixture. The missile fell a few inches but did not impact on any other object. There was no damage to missile or warheads.	After an enquiry, improvements in relevant documentation, test procedures, inspection and working practices were implemented.
5 1981	At sea	A number of missile diaphragms compressed onto Polaris missiles. There was no damage to missiles or warheads.	An enquiry determined that the incident was due to procedural error. A modification to the design of the missile tube pressurisation was made to prevent a recurrence of the problem.
6 August 1983	M8 near Glasgow	A RAF nuclear weapon load carrier carrying tow warheads for Polaris missiles was involved in a collision with a private car. Minor damage was caused to the load carrier. There was no damage to the warheads.	No blame was apportioned to the load carrier driver. No information is now available on any other action that may have been taken in response to this occurrence.
7 January 1987	Wiltshire	A RAF nuclear weapon load carrier carrying two WE177 nuclear weapons, seeking to avoid a	A Board of Inquiry found that all relevant orders, instructions and

stationary private vehicle, left the road after skidding on ice and rolled on to its side. A second carrier, which was also carrying two weapons, skidded on the road and came to rest partly off the road. The containerised weapons were not damaged. Minor damage was caused to the first load carrier.

operating procedures were compiled with and all personnel concerned showed adequate care. No person was held blameworthy.

Part 2 - Additional incidents referred to in the Oxburgh report, 1992

As defined in the Oxburgh report, an "incident" was an unplanned occurrence which did not constitute an accident "... but which need[ed] to be reported in the interests of safety, or because it [was] likely to attract the attention of the public or the media".

Date	Location	Cause and description	Results of any enquiry/subsequent action
8 1960	Lincolnshire	A RAF nuclear weapon load carrier forming part of a convoy experienced a brake failure on an incline and overturned. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon. [This event has some similarities to entries 1, 6 and 7 in Section 1 but pre-dates the current reporting system. As acknowledged in 2001, it is unclear on the limited information still available whether, in today's terms, it would be categorised as an accident.]	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
9 1963	RAF base in Lincolnshire	A rear trolley of a nuclear weapon transport became unhitched. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
10 1963	Lincolnshire/South Yorkshire	Brake failure on a nuclear weapon load carrier. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
11 March 1974	Cyprus	A spurious radiation monitor alarm. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	Modification was necessary to the pre-use check procedure of the monitor.
12 November 1974	Base in Germany	Hoist cable of a jib crane slipped on its drum and allowed a WE177 in its container to fall a short distance onto its trolley. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
13 1982	At sea	Damage to some nuclear weapon containers during transfer. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	In the light of these occurrences, CINCFLEET made a number of recommendations regarding weapon transfers.
14 May 1984	Base in Germany	A WE 177 nuclear weapon in its container was being moved on a trolley. The container had not been correctly secured and fell about 1 metre from the trolley during transit. The weapon casing suffered superficial damage from a toolbox which was fitted as standard to the inside of the container.	As a result of this occurrence, the toolbox was removed from all WE177 weapon containers.
15 June 1985	Near Glasgow	Brake failure on a nuclear weapon load carrier. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
16 December 1987	Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulport	Human error on the part of a crane driver following the development of a defect on a crane led to a missile	After an enquiry, substantial changes in management responsibilities, training,

		colliding with trailer supports. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	command and control and consultation with the Royal Navy were implemented.
17 August 1988	Off Hong Kong	Minor collision of a non-UK vessel with a moored UK vessel which was carrying nuclear weapons. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
18 September 1988	Somerset	A road traffic accident involving an unloaded nuclear weapon convoy. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.
19 December 1991	M25 in Hertfordshire	Mechanical failure of a RAF nuclear weapon load carrier. There was no damage to any nuclear weapon.	No specific record is now available of any enquiry or follow-up action.

The NFLA are not aware of any published unclassified accidents since 2003. The list above clearly highlights though that accidents do happen, even though in these cases there was no actual release of radioactive material.

6. Is there a chance of a radiation release from a weapons convoy accident?

In 2006 the New Scientist magazine published an article by Rob Edwards highlighting the possibility and the risks of a radiation release from a nuclear weapons convoy accident (7).

The MOD has always insisted that an accidental nuclear explosion could not happen in transit. This is due to the fact that a warhead's plutonium core would have to be 'compressed symmetrically by conventional explosives. UK nuclear weapons are designed to be single point safe' so a knock at a single point should not trigger all the explosives around the core'.

The article highlighted a declassified report from the Ministry of Defence which indicated that: "Trident nuclear weapons damaged in a vehicle pile-up or a plane crash could partially detonate and deliver a lethal radiation dose..." The article also went on to note that: "The MoD has also revealed that an attack by terrorists on a nuclear weapons convoy could produce an even more disastrous outcome. 'The consequences of such an incident are likely to be considerable loss of life,' says a senior MoD official."

The article continues: "A serious vehicle collision or an aircraft crash combined with multiple failures of the MoD's secret protective measures could mean that the weapon might not remain single-point safe. The report puts the overall yearly risk of an "inadvertent yield" in the UK at 2.4 in a billion, mainly due to the possibility of an aircraft crashing onto a convoy. Inadvertent yield suggests a partial nuclear explosion, also called fizzle yield, smaller than the full yield of up to 100 kilotons".

With regard to the effects of an accident it is worth distinguishing two scenarios:

- (a) An explosion or fire resulting in the dispersal of plutonium which is a long-term hazard and difficult to detect, resulting in not only short-term health hazards but long term environmental and economic impact.
- (b) A nuclear yield. This is far less likely and wouldn't be anything approaching the full 100 kiloton yield. Nevertheless a nuclear "fizzle" – a small nuclear yield is conceivable in some circumstances, such as an air crash.

These situations could be caused by either an accident, which is regarded as a hazard, or terrorism, which is regarded as a threat. Terrorist threats are not quantified as rigorously as accident hazards, even though they may be more likely.

The report judges this risk to be "tolerable". Nevertheless, the MoD has drawn up contingency plans for responding to such an event, which has "potentially high off-site consequences". The MoD report notes that radiation doses could range from 1 to 10 sieverts. According to the UK

Health Protection Agency, people exposed to 4 sieverts have a 50 per cent chance of dying from acute radiation poisoning, while 6 sieverts or more will kill everyone exposed. The report concludes that emergency arrangements are “adequate”, though it does not spell them out.

The article also noted the potential of risk from a terrorist attack. The MoD is unlikely to provide information in this area for national security interests. In May 2006 the then MoD’s Director of Information commented in the same article that: “Such an attack has the potential to lead to damage or destruction of a nuclear weapon. The consequences of such an incident are likely to be considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way of life and to the UK’s ability to function effectively as a sovereign state.”

7. **Results of the Scottish and English questionnaires on Local Authorities and nuclear weapons convoys**

In 2008 the Scottish Government set up an expert working group chaired by the Speaker of the Parliament, Bruce Crawford MSP, to investigate all aspects of Scotland’s involvement in the UK Trident nuclear deterrent based at the submarine base of Faslane. The published results of the report ‘Scotland without Nuclear Weapons’ were wide-ranging and multi-faceted.

The report concluded that:

- The tide of public opinion is turning away from reliance on nuclear weapons.
- The UK Government, as a signatory of the NPT, is obliged to take steps in good faith towards nuclear disarmament, and thus it is a question of when, not if, nuclear weapons will be removed from HMNB Clyde at Faslane.
- The UK Government should commit to not replacing Trident.
- The Scottish Government has a clear and legitimate interest in considering the removal of nuclear weapons from the country.
- There is a bright future for Scotland without nuclear weapons and the Working Group proposed a number of options to the Scottish Government relevant to its remit.

One of the most interesting sections of the report was a survey it made of Local Authority Emergency Planning Units in Scotland, as attached in Appendix 1 (8). The survey queried knowledge of nuclear convoys that came through the Council area, participation in emergency planning exercises and training around dealing with an emergency incident involving a convoy, knowledge of the legislative framework around nuclear emergency planning, and knowledge of the LAESI guidelines.

The results raised a number of issues and concerns:

- Local Authority Emergency Planning Units are largely not informed of nuclear weapons convoys in their area;
- Emergency Planning Officers with fixed nuclear sites in or near their area had been involved in exercises and training events, but outside such areas little had taken place and knowledge was therefore limited and patchy;
- Knowledge of the legislative framework around nuclear emergency planning was evident, but patchy and in places limited;
- Knowledge of the LAESI guidelines was patchy – though most thought they were well drafted, few Emergency Planning Officers had received any detailed briefings on them or been involved in any events to test a local response to them;
- Most did not feel competent to comment on the view that the worst case accident scenario involving nuclear weapons was a tanker fire involving a convoy;
- Mention was made by some Local Authority emergency planners of the national security arrangements and the sensitivity of the cargo on the convoys meaning that those informed of the convoys should be kept to a limit and be within national arrangements;
- Local Authority Emergency Planning Units would benefit from a briefing and some active training from the MoD;

- There appeared to be no independent assessment of the local risks of an emergency incident involving a convoy;
- The risks were only rarely noted on Local or Regional Resilience Forum risk registers (these provide the public with an assessment of the risks from various types of hazard which might cause emergency situations. The risk assessment of terrorist threats is also undertaken but the results are not publicly available due to national security considerations);
- As a result, the Scottish Government had asked Regional Resilience Forums to study the results and act accordingly.

On production of this report, the NFLA Secretariat was tasked by its Steering Committee to undertake an identical study of English and Welsh local authorities covered by the LAESI guidelines using the identical questions posed in Scotland. The results of this study are attached as Appendix 2 (9). The results mirror closely the points made above from Scotland.

Additional points of interest that arose from the NFLA questionnaire included:

- For those Local Authority Emergency Planning Units that had received some form of briefing, training or exercise from the MoD, they had noted that there had been too much emphasis placed on the safety of the containers holding radioactive materials and less on the key evacuation issues (such as establishment of rest / reception centres and involvement of specialised Council staff) that Councils would be involved with. Whereas the Local Authority's key objective would be primarily public safety, the military objective is security of the warhead.
- Most accepted the need for restricting information on convoys to avoid the possibility of terrorist groups becoming aware of them. (However, due to the involvement of Local Authorities in planning for CBRN (Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear) incidents, many Principal Officers do receive full security checks. In a former job, the NFLA Secretary received such a check when he chaired the West Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum's CBRN subgroup, due to sensitivity of the information being discussed).

8. **Brief overview of nuclear emergency planning arrangements in the UK and Ireland**

The findings from the questionnaire point to an issue that may be prevalent in other aspects of nuclear emergency planning arrangements for the UK and Ireland – that knowledge of nuclear emergency plans is generally good around fixed nuclear sites but that it is weaker and patchy in other areas. This is of particular concern when it comes to the transportation of nuclear materials by road, rail or sea which inevitably goes through areas without fixed nuclear sites.

It is therefore useful to provide a brief overview of nuclear emergency planning arrangements in the UK and Ireland to assist NFLA members and the wider emergency planning community in pursuing an improvement in any perceived gaps in knowledge, training or exercises.

The *Civil Contingences Act 2004* determines the large part of multi-agency emergency planning arrangements in the UK. In England the responsibilities for overseeing the Act lies with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) (10), which lies within the Cabinet Office. The CCS also provides strategic assistance and advice to devolved administrations. In Scotland, responsibility for overseeing the Act remains with the Civil Contingencies Division of the Scottish Executive's Justice Department. In Wales, a dedicated team of civil servants in the Welsh Assembly Government is represented on the key committee and forums determining UK civil protection policy. A Welsh Resilience Forum provides strategic advice to all key responding agencies. In Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office provides overseeing powers of civil protection in the province with the Central Emergency Planning Unit in the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister.

The Act places a legislative role on two groups of emergency responders. Category 1 or 'core' responders include all the emergency services, local authorities and the NHS, the Health Protection Agency and the Environment Agency / Scottish Environment Protection Agency / Northern Ireland Rivers Agency. Category 2 or 'co-operating' responders include all the major utility companies, public transport operators, Strategic Health Authorities and the Health and Safety Executive. Category 1 responders have a legal duty to produce emergency plans and business continuity plans; they need to warn and inform the public; produce a joint, public available risk assessment register and co-operate together in the planning for and responding in the event of a major incident. Category 2 responders are required to share information with Category 1 responders and co-operate with them as requested during an emergency incident.

The *Radiation Emergency Planning (Public Information) Regulations (REPPiR) 2001* is additional specific legislation on fixed nuclear sites. REPPiR establishes a framework of emergency preparedness measures to ensure that members of the public are properly informed and prepared, in advance, about what to do in the event of a radiation emergency occurring, and provided with information if a radiation emergency actually occurs. A "radiation emergency" is an event that is likely to result in a member of the public receiving an effective dose of 5 mSv during the year immediately following the emergency. REPPiR does not replace existing nuclear site licence conditions but operators of licensed sites who comply with those conditions will satisfy equivalent provisions in REPPiR. Again, the Health and Safety Executive (11) maintain the legislation and official guidance.

Local authorities have a duty to produce an offsite emergency plan around any fixed nuclear site that comes under the REPPiR regulations. All local authorities are also required to put in place an emergency plan that allows information to be provided to the public in the event of a radiation emergency. It is important to note that REPPiR does not apply to the off-site **movement** of nuclear materials. Local authorities are obliged to provide information to the public following a radiation emergency (Regulation 17) and this also applies to nuclear weapons' transport. However, the requirement for an operator's plan does not apply as it relates only to fixed sites. Local authorities' understanding of the situation can therefore be inconsistent.

NAIR, RIMNET and RADS SAFE – There are a number of national emergency warning systems in place in an incident involving radioactive materials.

NAIR (National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity). NAIR is a set of national arrangements that provide a 'long-stop' to other radiation emergency plans. NAIR has been designed to provide advice and assistance to the police in incidents involving radioactivity or suspected radioactivity where members of the public may require protection. As such, the police may call upon NAIR whenever they feel they have a need for radiological assistance in an incident and where no expert advice is otherwise available. NAIR is coordinated by the Health Protection Agency's Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (CRCE) and activated via the Civil Nuclear Constabulary's communications centre.

RIMNET (Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network). RIMNET consists of over 90 gamma radiation dose rate monitors sited throughout the UK and enables any increases in radiation levels from an overseas accident to be detected and monitored.

RADS SAFE is a consortium of organisations that have come together to offer mutual assistance in the event of a transport accident involving radioactive materials belonging to a RADS SAFE member. RADS SAFE does not cover MoD nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials movements. Further details of the RADS SAFE scheme can be found at <http://www.radsafe.org.uk/>.

Republic of Ireland arrangements - In the Republic of Ireland emergency planning arrangements are the responsibility of the Office of Emergency Planning in the Department of Defence (12) and relevant government departments depending on the type of emergency incident. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government has the lead role for the National Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents and is supported by an

Emergency Response Co-ordination Committee. There is no specific body like the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Republic of Ireland and the Emergency Planning Society Republic of Ireland Branch is lobbying for a more robust structure in the country.

What is important to stress is that all these arrangements generally provide a robust and resilient emergency planning framework for fixed nuclear sites. As the questionnaire results indicate - as does NFLA Briefing 75 on emergency planning arrangements for transportation of nuclear materials by sea - there may be some gaps and anomalies in Local Authority areas which do not have such fixed nuclear sites but who do have mobile nuclear materials going through their area or passing by it on the open sea.

9. UK Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group

The UK Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (13) is chaired by the Department of Climate Change and Energy. It brings together organisations with interests in off-site civil nuclear emergency planning. It is a forum for discussing common problems, exchanging information and experience and agreeing improvements in planning, procedures and organisation. Local Authorities are represented through the Local Government Association, but professional membership associations like the Emergency Planning Society and the Business Continuity Institute do not appear to be directly involved in this. The MoD does attend these meetings but emergency planning at military nuclear sites is not included in the remit of the group.

The NEPLG issues Consolidated Guidance to all those involved in the development of site-specific emergency plans at the local level and validates all off-site exercises. The guidance provides a comprehensive set of recommendations for developing plans using the framework of the REPPIR regulations and the process of the Civil Contingences Act.

As with the LAESI guidelines, the lack of Local Authority emergency planning officers on the NEPLG, particularly those who do not have fixed nuclear sites in their area, can translate again in a general lack of knowledge and awareness on nuclear emergency planning matters across the whole Local Authority Emergency Planning community. Looking at the minutes of past meetings, the NFLA notes that a NEPLG organised local government seminar was held in 2009, but attended largely by emergency planning officers with fixed civil nuclear sites in their area.

10. Recommendations

The NFLA Secretariat plans to use this briefing, and the information garnered from NFLA Policy Briefing 75, in a number of ways as follows:

- It will send both briefings to the appropriate Government agencies – the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Transport, the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, appropriate bodies in the devolved assemblies, the Republic of Ireland Office of Emergency Planning and other agencies as appropriate – and ask it to consider the concerns and perceived gaps raised in the briefing. It will also urge them to send out updated guidance on nuclear emergency planning issues to Local Authorities and encourage them to be **proactive, rather than reactive**, at offering briefings, training and exercise opportunities to all local authorities in the areas of nuclear material transportation in particular.
- It will also argue that Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers and Fire and Rescue Services receive information on the route of nuclear weapons convoys, subject to them receiving adequate security clearance.
- It will send both briefings to Emergency Planning Officers covered by the LAESI guidelines for information and to encourage them to lobby for greater awareness, training and exercising in this area. It will also urge them to place nuclear materials

transportation as a potential 'risk' on Local and Regional Resilience Forum risk registers.

- It will send NFLA briefings 74 and 75 to the Emergency Planning Society for the UK and the Republic of Ireland.
- It will encourage NFLA member and officer contacts and civil society groups to speak to their own Emergency Planning Officers to clarify knowledge of, and training in, nuclear emergency planning workstreams.
- It will seek to organize a special seminar on nuclear emergency planning issues for NFLA members, opened out to local authority (and other appropriate agency) emergency planning officers.

11. References:

- (1) Report of the Scottish Government's Working Group on Nuclear Weapons – Scotland without Nuclear Weapons – <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/288148/0088043.pdf>
- (2) Royal Navy – <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operations-and-support/establishments/naval-bases-and-air-stations/hmnb-clyde/>
- (3) Nukewatch – map of convoy routes – <http://www.nukewatch.org.uk/run.php>
- (4) Nukewatch, see reference (3) for link.
- (5) Ministry of Defence Local Authority Emergency Services Information (LAESI) Guidance for Nuclear Weapons Transport Edition 7– Can be found on the MOD's website: <http://www.mod.uk>
- (6) Quoted on Nukewatch website – <http://www.nukewatch.org.uk/accidents.php>
- (7) New Scientist magazine, 5th July 2006, can be downloaded from - http://www.robedwards.com/2006/07/road_crash_coul.html
- (8) See reference (1) for link
- (9) NFLA Secretariat questionnaire – see Appendix 2 below.
- (10) Civil Contingencies Secretariat – <http://www.ukresilience.aspx>
- (11) The REPPIR regulations can be downloaded from the Health and Safety Executive website at the following link - <http://www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ionising/reppir.htm>
- (12) Republic of Ireland Department of Defence Office of Emergency Planning - <http://www.emergencyplanning.ie/>
- (13) UK Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group - http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/uk_supply/energy_mix/nuclear/issues/emergency_plan/neplg/neplg.aspx

Please note: Appendix 1 and 2 follow on the next page.

Scottish Parliament survey of Councils knowledge of nuclear weapons convoys

(taken verbatim from the Scottish Parliament's Working Group on Nuclear Weapons report, see Reference 1 above for full weblink)

Q1: How many nuclear weapons convoys have travelled through your local authority in, say, the last 5 years? Have you had prior warning when convoys have passed through? Would prior warning have helped you plan better for these transits? Have there been any issues of concern for you during these transits?	
Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I have no idea if any convoys have passed through – I'm sure that police colleagues would have this info – but I guess it identifies a gap as I have no knowledge either way if in fact any convoys have passed through
Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No notice given of any – MOD says info is secret!
Clackmannanshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No such convoys; could be a possible diversionary route in the event of problems on the main convoy routes
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is not something that the Local Authority is concerned with – security for nuclear convoy is the remit of central government (reserved to Westminster) and the security forces – it is a matter of national security. If an incident occurred and if we were requested to support the response we would employ generic emergency response – this response would be informed by the LAESI guidelines. Our arrangements are generic – we would deal with consequences (with advice from a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell) and not the causation.
Dundee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I have been in post for almost 3 years and have had no involvement with nuclear weapons in transit through Dundee
East Ayrshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very few if any dealings with convoys in 12 yrs
Falkirk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No significant issues of note or concern Over the years, there have been no significant issues of note or concern arising from such practice. Falkirk Council is fully aware of the "Local Authority and Emergency Services Information" arrangements and has confidence in our partners within the Central Scotland Strategic Coordinating Group and our individual and collective emergency planning arrangements.
Grampian EPU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not aware of any; not been informed; no involvement in any exercises nor looked closely at the legislative framework
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not aware of any; police will have this info if it exists
North Ayrshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not informed – but wouldn't be concerned if there were
Orkney Islands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No convoys ever come through the islands and no knowledge of submarines passing through
Perth & Kinross	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No knowledge of any
South Lanarkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We are unable to answer this question as we have no information in relation to nuclear convoys passing through the council area and

	have had no incidents or issues that have given us cause for concern
Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No info received on convoys from MOD or police ▪ Our response to any incident would be via our generic major emergency management procedures and therefore prior warning would not assist planning however it would allow us to put certain aspects of our response 'on standby'. I have no issues of concern.
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Never been informed of any convoys; however many have actually travelled to Couplort over the past 5 years. Only aware of one if there is a CND protest – a concern in itself ▪ Regulation 17 of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPPIR) – useful to be informed or involved to allow timely implementation of those procedures should the need arise. ▪ Another concern is that LAESI indicates that <i>“the immediate hazard area i.e. within the 600-metre evacuation cordon the major hazard is from the conventional effects of the accident, in particular from the potential for a conventional explosion and MoD would advise that this area should be evacuated in order to provide protection”</i> The usual convoy route passes through an urbanized area which would mean that a significant number of people would require to be evacuated from this 600 metre cordon which would in turn cause problems authority in finding appropriate emergency accommodation for them. ▪ Requirement of Las to maintain procedures under Reg 17 of REPPPIR means it would be useful to be informed or involved to allow timely implementation of those procedures should need arise
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Las not advised of convoys passing through their area ▪ Prior warning – good to know but wouldn't have considered that the level of risk required any special arrangements to be put in place.

Q2: When did you last participate or lead an exercise simulating an emergency with a nuclear weapons convoy? Did this exercise raise any particular concerns for you?	
Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I have never been involved
Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Never participated – assume such things organised by MOD
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There are “live” exercises led by MoD at Helensburgh and we have been invited fairly regularly. The last exercise I attended was not a cause for concern.
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not participated during last 5 yrs
North Ayrshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hunterston Nuclear Power Station & Decommissioning Site is in N Ayrshire and robust plans are in place with regular training being carried out to deal with any nuclear accident.
South Lanarkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We last participated in an event focusing on nuclear weapon convoys in the late 1990s, I am unable to provide the exact date/year

Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The last exercise I participated in was four years ago at Faslane / Coulport. I have been involved in other events related to nuclear issues though not specifically a weapons convoy. ▪ I was reassured concerning the safety of the convoys and concerning the support available in the unlikely event that an accident should occur
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The CPO last participated in a nuclear weapon convoy exercise as part of a course attended at RAF Brampton in February 1999
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2004 and a number of MoD awareness sessions
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clackmannanshire, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Falkirk, Grampian EPU, Perth & Kinross

Q3: Is the legislative framework covering nuclear weapons convoys sufficiently clear? If not, what areas need to be clarified?

Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This is not an area I am familiar with – so an update and or guidance would be helpful
Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It's clear for other agencies, but I don't see anything for the local authority in there; should it show what our roles and responsibilities would be in a convoy incident? ▪ What are my responsibilities as an EPO for the Council in such an incident?
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The LAESI guidance is clear and informs our planning assumptions / generic planning
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Legislative framework seems clear
South Lanarkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I am unable to answer this question as I am unfamiliar with the legislative framework – unless this refers to REPPiR
Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I think that the legislative framework is adequate and the roles and responsibilities are clear.
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Apart from REPPiR (17) and LAESI, unaware of other appropriate information or legislation regarding weapons convoys so cannot comment.
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not clear what is the relevant legislation
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clackmannanshire, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Falkirk, Grampian EPU, North Ayrshire, Perth & Kinross

Q4: How do you think that nuclear weapons transits are covered by the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPiR)? Do you have sufficient risk information on weapons accidents from the MoD to scope the relevance of these regulations? What action have you taken under these regulations?

Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ None
Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To my knowledge, I don't think they are, sorry I don't have the time to read through the whole REPPiR Reg to look for a part on convoys. I understood that it was only the LAESI doc that covered this. ▪ I have no risk information from the MOD, other than what is in the LAESI doc and what was taught at the course many years ago. ▪ No action taken
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In D&G we have to comply with REPPiR in for the fixed nuclear installation at Chapelcross. In general the information contained in LAESI is as adequate as the information that we would put in the public domain in relation to a nuclear power station. Again there are national security issues associated with the transportation of nuclear weapons – even if we knew about these we'd need to seek advice before putting these movements into the public domain – perhaps on the advice of the Fol commissioner
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ REPPiR would appear to have been adequate to date. Community Risk Register has assessed the risk.
South Lanarkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As nuclear convoys are not fixed nuclear sites – and on the basis that we have no information on when or where nuclear convoys may pass through the council area – we have no specific risk assessments or plans for responding to an incident involving a nuclear convoy. ▪ Our generic emergency procedures would be utilised in the first instance. However, an incident of this type would immediately be classified as a national emergency and appropriate national contingency arrangements and co-ordination implemented. That being the case, we are clear on our role and responsibilities as a local authority and would respond accordingly. ▪ A nuclear convoy accident is not included in the national risk assessment (see Scottish Local Risk Assessment Guidance March 2008), and as such is not included in our local area risk register.
Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Nuclear weapons transits are not covered at all well by the REPPiR regs. There is an implication that road transport is not included in the regs. ▪ We do not have any risk information from the MOD other than that contained within the Community Risk Register which does not give much detail. ▪ Stirling has arrangements to provide information to the public should a radiation emergency arise. (These are generic arrangements under CCA not specific to nuclear incidents)
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ REPPiR Regulation 17 applies to ALL local authorities irrespective of the rest of REPPiR, and it relates to general duties on local authorities to

	<p>have arrangements in place to provide information to the public with regard to any kind of radiation emergency (including those involving nuclear weapon convoys).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information on the risk of a contamination incident resulting from a convoy is contained within the REPPIR (17) draft procedures which the Authority has produced to ensure that senior officers can determine whether members of the public would benefit from taking protective measures following an incident resulting in contamination
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not as far as I know N/A No action taken under these regulations
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clackmannanshire, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Falkirk, Grampian EPU, North Ayrshire, Perth & Kinross

Q5: Do you think the LAESI guidelines provide you with sufficient guidance on dealing with nuclear convoy emergencies?	
Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not an area I am familiar with
Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There seems to be no guidance for local authorities.
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For the purposes of local Authorities – yes
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LAESI guideline has been sufficient to date
South Lanarkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes
Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I think that the LAESI guidelines do provide sufficient guidance in a very clear and concise manner
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information contained in the LAESI document is sufficient for local authority purposes and is used to inform the risk assessments carried out for the Community Risk Register
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clackmannanshire, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Falkirk, Grampian EPU, North Ayrshire, Perth & Kinross

Q6: Do you think that you have been sufficiently involved in planning for nuclear weapons convoy emergencies? Do you think that the threat of terrorism has been properly included in the current preparations?	
Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No

Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No ▪ Don't know, what are the current preparations for the threat of terrorism?
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This is not something that the Local Authority is concerned with – security for nuclear convoy is the remit of central government (reserved to Westminster) and the security forces – it is a matter of national security
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The level of our involvement is in direct correlation to the number of convoys that we have been made aware of. ▪ We are not party to the preparations for dealing with a terrorist threat.
South Lanarkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have never been involved in planning for nuclear convoy emergencies – however as stated before, we are clear on our role and responsibilities as a local authority and as a category one responder and our Contingency Planning Team are sufficiently knowledgeable in the subject area to be able to advise / guide any council response required. ▪ In relation to the issue of terrorism, our only comment is that one of the principles of emergency planning is that the response should focus on the effects and not the cause. In that respect the threat of terrorism in relation to nuclear convoys is not a factor for emergency planning/response but rather a factor in relation to the security of such convoys.
Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I have not been involved at all in any planning for nuclear weapons convoy emergencies however as I stated at point 2, I was reassured concerning the safety of the convoys and concerning the support available in the unlikely event that an accident should occur. The response arrangements from the MOD are I believe fit for purpose and our generic emergency response plan will dovetail with the MOD response. ▪ I have no knowledge as to the inclusion of the threat of terrorism in MOD preparations however I would imagine that convoys represent a 'soft target' and this should be part of preparations.
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This LA never has been involved in planning for convoy emergencies and cannot therefore comment if the threat of terrorism has been included.
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I wouldn't expect to be consulted as this is undertaken by MoD ▪ Unable to comment on preparations for threat of terrorism
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clackmannanshire, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Falkirk, Grampian EPU, North Ayrshire, Perth & Kinross

Q7: We think the 'worst-case' emergency included in the LAESI guidelines is of a tanker fire engulfing a weapons transporter and allowing a limited release of radio-activity but no nuclear explosion, do you concur? Are you aware of any independent assessment of this risk? Are you content that this is indeed the worst case that you should make plans for?

Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not aware of any assessment of this risk – additional consideration
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	should be given to relevant SCG s in this regard
Argyll & Bute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Don't know enough to comment on this "worst-case emergency ▪ Not aware of any independent assessment of this risk ▪ I'm not making plans for any of this, should I be? Isn't it the MOD which has the plans? I think I would just be advised by the MOD
Dumfries and Galloway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ See above: This is not something that the Local Authority is concerned with – security for nuclear convoy is the remit of central government (reserved to Westminster) and the security forces – it is a matter of national security
Midlothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have been led to believe that this is the worst case scenario and have no evidence to the contrary. If you are indicating that this is not the case I am sure that our risk assessment in the CRR would need to reflect an evidenced based increase in risk.
Stirling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I agree with your assessment of the worst case scenario ▪ I am not aware of any independent assessment of this risk
West Dunbartonshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Would agree with the 'worst case' scenario proposed. ▪ A Community Risk Register is maintained by Strathclyde Emergency Co-ordinating Group. ▪ Any plans would reflect the requirements of IEM and the response would be to the effects of an incident rather than the cause and while it would pay heed to a worst case scenario, it would not rely upon it to dictate the level or type of response
West Lothian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes ▪ No ▪ Yes, as far as I know
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clacks, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Falkirk, Grampian EPU, North Ayrshire, Perth & Kinross

Other Comments	
Angus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For those LA who do not have as much input to this specialist area – it would be helpful to be kept up to date in the event circumstances changing and for mutual aid purposes.

<p><i>Dumfries and Galloway</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It seems to me that you are asking the questions of the wrong I. The duty for local authorities is to have generic response plans in place to deal with the effects of an emergency and not the causes. We are not part of the security forces and would not expect to be informed about issues which would relate to national security. In addition other than in the very generic planning arena and potentially from the environmental health position I would not expect Local Authorities to be consulted on issues relating to nuclear or radiological matters.
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Appendix 2

NFLA Secretariat survey of English Councils on weapons convoys

(comments taken verbatim directly from emailed responses to the NFLA Secretariat)

<p>Q1: How many nuclear weapons convoys have travelled through your local authority in, say, the last 5 years? Have you had prior warning when convoys have passed through? Would prior warning have helped you plan better for these transits? Have there been any issues of concern for you during these transits?</p>	
<p>Birmingham City Council</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From the police point of view. We receive confidential or above notification of transports of nuclear material through the West Midlands. Due to the nature of the transits these are restricted on Oasis which may be searchable. We do not pass this information on to local authorities due to its classification level. Can't give you numbers though in the last twelve months we have had very few transits across the area.
<p>Calderdale MBC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No to all
<p>Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Having checked with Cleveland Police there has been no convoys which have passed through in the past 5 years. Cleveland and in particular the A19 is only used as a back up in the event on an incident on the A1 and other routes.
<p>Dudley</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have no knowledge of any convoys, the only use this will be is a prior knowledge that this is occurring would give a heads up, however we would need to provide accommodation for evacuees, as it is unknown where precisely this would occur it would be of little use. Our Generic Emergency Plan, together with Rest Centre Provision, Public Information and media Plans and CBRN Recovery would kick in following any incident. Security for these convoys rests with the MOD whose officers accompany these convoys. Immediate and Follow on Emergency Forces are also on standby are available in case of any incident. The method of carriage of these substances ensures a high degree of resilience.
<p>Flintshire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None.
<p>Hertfordshire County Council</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Given that I cannot provide you with an answer on numbers, this either means that we have not had any for some time or that we have not received any information about them if they have occurred as we have had no involvement in any such activity.

Kirklees Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have no information in relation to nuclear convoys passing through Kirklees and have had no incidents or issues that have given us cause for concern. I understand that the Police within West Yorkshire do not inform the LA when nuclear weapons are being transported.
Lancashire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unable to respond to this question.
Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not to my knowledge.
Rotherham Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have been to a number of conferences/seminars where arrangements in place to manage nuclear weapons convoys moving through our area have been discussed and we are happy that the arrangements that are in place are robust and fit for purpose and that every eventuality from a health and safety perspective has been considered and addressed. ▪ South Yorkshire Police are kept informed about convoys passing through our area and our close working relationship with the police assures us that were there any issues about a convoy then we would be informed.
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Given that I cannot provide you with an answer on numbers, this either means that we have not had any for some time or that we have not received any information about them if they have occurred, as we have had no involvement in any such activity. ▪ I assume that Merseyside Police (Force Operations) are made aware of "transits" in the Merseyside area of the M6 corridor. The M6 only intersects the borough of St Helens for a relatively short distance at Newton-le Willows.
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ a) Don't know b) No c) No d) Don't know
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I have no idea – not informed.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No notification – would be helpful.
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>

Q2: When did you last participate or lead an exercise simulating an emergency with a nuclear weapons convoy? Did this exercise raise any particular concerns for you?

Birmingham City Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No exercises have taken place in the last twelve months to my knowledge. Convoys are self contained with specialist, armed escorts and recovery facilities.
Calderdale MBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Never
Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As the emergency planning officer for Hartlepool I have not participated in any exercises simulating an emergency with a nuclear weapons convoy. I have also checked with our Chief Emergency Planning Officer who has been with the unit for more than five years and he also has not

	participated in any.
Dudley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have annual multi agency exercises; none of these have been specifically aimed at MOD convoys, without the participation of the MOD, which is highly unlikely this would not be an effective exercise. However our role within these types of incidents will differ little from other exercises conducted and incidents planned for. The Emergency Services together with the MOD will deal with the initial impact. ▪ I note that the MOD do undertake exercises in this and would if asked attend or facilitate the organisation of such locally. ▪ We have no nuclear establishments within the area.
Flintshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have never taken part in any such exercise.
Hertfordshire County Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There has not been any involvement in such an exercise in Hertfordshire involving local authorities (HCC or district/borough councils), and as secretariat to the LRF, are not aware of any such exercise at all in Hertfordshire.
Kirklees Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Never. Not applicable.
Lancashire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Have not yet participated in any exercises of this nature.
Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Never
Rotherham Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We took part in a multi agency New Salesman exercise, Exercise Solar Victory in 2008 which focused on an incident affecting a nuclear weapons convoy in our area which again reassured us that the convoys are well managed.
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As far as I am aware there has not been any involvement in such an exercise within Merseyside involving local authorities, although a representative from the Merseyside local authorities attended a nuclear weapons briefing update approximately 3 years ago.
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ a) 2008 b) Difficulty in keeping LA delegates interested
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I do not recall ever having been involved with one.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Never.</i>
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>

Q3: Is the legislative framework covering nuclear weapons convoys sufficiently clear? If not, what areas need to be clarified?

<p>Birmingham City Council</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The planning and preparation for police is fine we have a Nuclear Material Road Convoys Plan, LAESI Information, ACPO (TAM) Transportation by Road of Nuclear Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Guidance (SECRET) and ACPO Transportation of Nuclear Material in the UK and overseas (Confidential). So for us and the military there is sufficient planning and guidance in place. The material is ultimately safe even an RTC would not cause any concern to the packaging.
<p>Calderdale MBC</p>	<p>Not seen the legislation to comment</p>
<p>Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes after having a brief look at it seems to be clear but having not had any dealings with this aspect of work I couldn't say whether it needed clarification.
<p>Dudley</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The CCA outlines the responsibility of all organisations involved to plan for any emergency situation, we as local authorities have our part to play irrespective of the incident. As far as nuclear weapons convoys are concerned I am only aware of RIPPIR and the LAESI (MOD Document) apart from HSE regulation which applies. I do think that this is sufficient for local authorities.
<p>Flintshire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes it is sufficiently clear.
<p>Hertfordshire County Council</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I have no knowledge of the legislative framework and therefore cannot really comment. I would, however, suggest that this is not an issue which is widely known about and awareness could definitely be improved.
<p>Kirklees Council</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not really applicable to Kirklees.
<p>Lancashire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appears to be through LAESI (Local Authority Emergency Services Information) guidelines.

Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I am aware of the contents but have never had occasion to use the document.
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>I have no knowledge of the legislative framework and therefore unable to comment.</i>
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nothing was raised in the exercise. Reference was made to the LAESI document and the operational codenames were an issue and have been raised with the LGA.
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Higher profile required.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Not looked at it.</i>
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>
<p>Q4: How do you think that nuclear weapons transits are covered by the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPiR)? Do you have sufficient risk information on weapons accidents from the Ministry of Defence to scope the relevance of these regulations? What action have you taken under these regulations?</p>	
Birmingham City Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Should there be a nuclear accident it will be treated as per any other nuclear accident but would have specialist knowledge readily available so in effect be in a better position to respond.
Calderdale MBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A fire Service responsibility.
Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> After looking at the REPPiR guidance we have mainly been dealing with the off-site consequences and not really looked into the transport of nuclear weapons. Transportation seems to only be dealt with in regulation 8 and then doesn't go into the transport of nuclear weapons just on the carriers themselves having an emergency plan.
Dudley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although not specific, the RIPPIR Regulations are clear in the local authority's response, in that Regulation 17 applies to all local authorities irrespective of the rest of RIPPIR, and it relates to the general duties of the LA to have arrangements to provide information about any kind of radiation emergency. We are the Host Local Authority under RIMNET for the West Midlands. Regulation 17.1 is also explicit in that every LA shall prepare and keep up to date arrangements to supply, in the event of any radiation emergency, information of and advice on the facts of the emergency, of the steps to be taken, as appropriate, of health protection measures applicable. (how so ever that emergency may arise). To these end our Public Information and Media Plan covers this in consultation, at that time with the HPA, on the type of radiation and necessary information.
Flintshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have not had any risk information. We have produced a REPPiR plan.

Hertfordshire County Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I am aware of the existence of REPPIR regulations, but am not familiar with the content of the regulations and how nuclear transits are covered by them. Military convoys are mentioned in the individual risk assessment in our Community Risk Register, but this is not in any detail. I believe more risk information could be made more available to us to keep us better informed.
Kirklees Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On the basis that we have no information on when or where nuclear convoys may pass through our area we have no specific risk assessments or plans for responding to an incident involving a nuclear convoy. Our generic emergency procedures would be utilised in the first instance.
Lancashire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unable to respond to this question.
Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No risk information
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I am aware of the existence of REPPIR regulations, but I am not familiar with the content of the regulations and how nuclear transits are covered by them. I am not sure if Military convoys are mentioned in the individual risk assessment in our Community Risk Register.
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It was clear from the exercise that public information was well prepared for but was of interest to our Public Information Forum.
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No action taken to date. Insufficient information readily to hand.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>No action undertaken.</i>
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>

Q5: Do you think the LAESI (Local Authority Emergency Services Information) guidelines provide you with sufficient guidance on dealing with nuclear convoy emergencies?	
Birmingham City Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes particularly with other guidance we have.
Calderdale MBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Never seen the document.
Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> After having a read of the latest LAESI guidelines they seem to cover the nuclear convoy emergencies quite adequately and provide an insight to personnel who have not had any dealings with the convoys.
Dudley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From the LA perspective yes it refers rightly to the Civil Contingencies Act and our responsibilities under that.
Flintshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes.

Hertfordshire County Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I am not familiar with the guidelines and have struggled to find a copy via the MOD website. I cannot really comment. They may well provide sufficient guidance, but are not in a position to judge.
Kirklees Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes.
Lancashire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> They appear to.
Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes, from a local authority perspective we would endeavour to assist blue light services.
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I am not familiar with the guidelines. They may well provide sufficient guidance, but I am not in a position to comment.
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Probably together with our own generic understanding of incidents. The issue really surrounds the multi agency information exchange.
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes but not rehearsed – LA involvement limited in terms of capability.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Not seen.</i>
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>

Q6: Do you think that you have been sufficiently involved in planning for nuclear weapons convoy emergencies? Do you think that the threat of terrorism has been properly included in the current preparations?

Birmingham City Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Planning is taken at National level with military advisors and specialists. Terrorism is part of our everyday business and is a large part of the risk assessments undertaken by the military in deciding the most appropriate transportation methods.
Calderdale MBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No.
Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As stated at question 2. We as a unit have not been involved in the planning for nuclear weapons convoy emergencies and thus can't answer the question fully.
Dudley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With the specialist nature of the response phase to these incidents and the rarity of such, then the planning for and training for is the responsibility of the MOD. I am assured by the MOD and the LAESI (it produces) that this is planned for. With the closely controlled nature of this activity it is unlikely that terrorist groups would be aware of the routes taken or the timing of these events.

	<p>It is therefore more prevalent that those informed are kept to a minimum, in order to keep security around such events.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I would assume as with the Critical National Infrastructure and policing of Nuclear Power Stations this has been addressed but is not publicised.
Flintshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have not been involved in planning for nuclear weapons convoy emergencies.
Hertfordshire County Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been no involvement. Whether this is because it does not happen here or that we have not been involved is unclear. I would certainly welcome a greater involvement and opportunity to increase our knowledge in this area.
Kirklees Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have not been involved in planning for nuclear convoy emergencies however we are clear on our role and responsibilities as a local authority and as a Category 1 responder. One of the principles of emergency planning is that the response should focus on the effects and not the cause. In that respect the threat of terrorism in relation to nuclear convoys is not a factor for emergency planning/response.
Lancashire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I have attended several training sessions.
Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I have not been involved in planning a response.
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Because of limited involvement, I am unable to comment.
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have had annual briefings from the Convoy Commanders and have been involved in a table top exercise, however the emphasis is that the flasks are indestructible and therefore exercises really do not get into the contamination and evacuation issues that affect LA's.
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No.
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>

<p>Q7: We think the 'worst-case' emergency included in the LAESI guidelines is of a tanker fire engulfing a weapons transport convoy and allowing a limited release of radioactivity but no nuclear explosion, do you concur? Are you aware of any independent assessment of this risk? Are you content that this is indeed the worst case that you should make plans for?</p>	
Birmingham City Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes. The lorries, containers and make up of the convoy are sufficient to protect the material. In the worst case scenario even a fire would have to be very severe and pro longed to enable it to have any affect on the nuclear material being transported and would have to penetrate through multi layers to have any effect.
Calderdale MBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No

Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (Hartlepool)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I couldn't find any mention of worst case scenarios within the LAESI guidelines so couldn't comment on it.
Dudley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The possibility of a scenario as you suggest is probably very low, there are other scenarios which could have the same possibility. The specialist methods of transport utilised by the MOD limit the possibility of such incidents, and the best possible methods of construction of these modes of transport is used following, I have no doubt rigorous risk assessments. ▪ Our own Risk Assessment does take account of Nuclear and Radiation Incidents. ▪ The worst case scenario is any release however caused.
Flintshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We do not have the expertise to determine the worst case scenario.
Hertfordshire County Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I have no real knowledge to be able to offer an informed opinion on this. We do not cover a worst case scenario in the individual risk assessment as we have no real information on which to base this. and there are no independent assessments of this risk.
Kirklees Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes, included within Community Risk Register.
Lancashire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unable to respond to this question.
Luton Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ a) Yes ▪ b) No ▪ c) Yes
Rotherham Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ We have a REPIR plan in place in South Yorkshire to ensure that public warning and informing arrangements are in place for any radiation incidents.
St Helen's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I have no real knowledge to be able to offer an informed opinion on this. We do not cover a worst case scenario in an individual risk assessment, as we have no real information on which to base this and there are no independent assessments of this risk.
Sheffield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As Q6.
Swindon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not aware of the independent risk assessment. Not sure if this is the worst case scenario.
Windsor and Maidenhead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes.
No Comment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Bristol, Cumbria, Durham</i>

Other Comments	
Bedfordshire Borough Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bedfordshire Local Resilience Forum does not hold the information to provide a full response.
Leeds, West Yorkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ West Yorkshire Police does not inform Local Authorities when nuclear materials/weapons are being transported through the county. ▪ The Risk and capabilities group do however consider the risk as part of the CRR assessment.
Manchester City Council	“Thank you for bringing the issues to our attention.”
Norfolk County Council	Confirmed that Norfolk does not have any convoys through the County, therefore cannot make any comment.
Plymouth	Confirmed: “No nuclear weapons convoys have travelled through this Local Authority area. We enjoy an excellent Partnership with the MOD and Babcock Marine at HMNB Devonport in the context of REPPiR and our legal duties in the preparation and testing of our respective on site and off site emergency plans.”
Suffolk	Confirmed: “No nuclear weapon materials are transported through this county.”